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Abstract
The transition of the »Old Communist« countries of East and Central Europe has been
disappointingly slow given the amount of physical and human capital available at the start of the
transition. We argue that this slowness is caused by the lack of social capital, which is an
important factor of production. The Communist system replaced it with an official organization
of society. Further, the communist system needed a set of grey/black networks of »fixers« to give
it the necessary flexibility. These networks were tolerated, but controlled. When the Communist
regime ceased the official organizations collapsed and so did most of the control systems. This
allowed a flourishing of the grey/black networks, which can be harmful to the operations of a
market economy. The available data are still scanty, but they confirm the argument. 
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2. However, there seems to have been a large relative growth in the unrecorded »shadow« economy since
then, as discussed in Section IV. Some calculations suggest that the increase is no less than 25% of GDP
in the average OC-economy. If this is true, the development is much less disappointing than argued in
the text. 
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Written for the Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition
»During the past 70 years, a new man has been
  created who is obedient and easily frightened.
  What has been created over the decades
  cannot be undone in a day.«
Bulat Okudzhava, 1989.
I  Introduction: A missing link?
The collapse of the old centrally-planned (Communist) system in East and Central Europe - from
now the OC-countries - took place only one decade ago. Much has happened, and when one
walks down a street in central Moscow on a sunny spring day, it looks as a typical European
capital.
1) Wealth is apparent, shops are booming, people are well dressed, and private cars are
everywhere. However, the data tell another story. The economic development of the countries
in transition of the OC-country has been disappointing in three ways: 
(d1) The output collapse just after the big change in 1989/90 was on average 40% of GDP.
(d2) The upswing has been slow. In some cases it has hardly even started.
2)
(d3) The transition has caused an increase in corruption, rent-seeking and crime.
The main reason that most economists expected a small adjustment crisis (not d1) and a quick
upswing (not d2), was the predictions from the theory of economic growth. It speaks of steady
state growth paths determined by the stocks of human and physical capital. The OC-countries
did have large stocks of both capitals before the transition. The existing stocks of the two capitals
were not made for a market economy. So they should not be valued at reproduction costs.
However, even after writing off say 25%, a lot would have been left. Further, the standard of
living in the post transition OC-countries was much lower than it should have been given the
existing stocks of the two capitals, so things looked promising.
The reasons for both (d1) and (d2) remain hotly debated. The logical explanation is that
something intangible is missing. Maybe the 70 to 45 years of socialism destroyed some X, which
is hard to rebuild. Often it is argued that X is »initiative«, »business knowledge« or even the
»spirit of capitalism«. However, such proposals seem without a theoretical basis. We argue that
X is social capital, ￿. 
Item (d3) is easier to understand, though it was still unpredicted. Below we treat it as a
consequence of the rise in negative social capital (￿ 
￿), and use the available data on corruption3. See Paldam & Svendsen (2000), Svendsen & Svendsen (2000) and Paldam (2000b).
4. The origins of the network definition is hard to trace, but something like it is found in Coleman (1987)
and the trust definition may originate in Fukyama (1995). Both authors quote earlier thinkers. The main
problem is that social capital is a joint name given to synthesize old thoughts.
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perceptions as an indicator of the size of the phenomenon. The interaction between »normal«
(positive) social capital (￿ 
+) and »negative« social capital (￿ 
￿) is not well known, but will be
an important subject below.
The main theory behind the study is the dictatorship theory of missing social capital. It
argues that dictatorships - especially totalitarian ones - destroy social capital. Some dictatorships
such as the Communist ones even create conditions that favor the building of negative social
capital. When dictatorships are abolished, social capital may develop negatively and act as a
brake on economic development.
Standard textbooks on the transition - as Gros & Steinherr (1995) and Lavigne (1999) -
do not even mention social capital. We try to provide the reverse case and see how much social
capital can potentially explain, and to assess if the available data support this explanation. We do
not attempt to compare »our« explanation with alternative explanations.
Section II reviews the main definitions of social capital and relates it to the economy.
Section III proposes three hypotheses concerning the level of social capital in Eastern Europe
arguing that the old communist systems destroyed normal social capital, while feeding negative
social capital. Consequently, social capital may be a major part of the explanation for (d1), (d2)
and (d3). Section IV presents some data from the World Value Survey and Transparency
International in a preliminary attempt to test the argument. In addition, a few scattered
observations will be considered. Section V is a brief conclusion.
II  Social capital theory: definitions and the relation to other matters
This section will be dogmatically short, as we have developed our views - with the necessary
qualifications - elsewhere
3) - we concentrate on normal (positive) social capital: ￿ ￿￿ 
(+). 
II.1  Two definitions, a reformulation and a proxy
Most definitions of social capital are summarized in Table 1. It gives two definitions,
4)  and a
reformulation in the language of game theory. Also, an easy-to-use proxy named Putnam’s
Instrument is given.5. It did take a long time for the profession to come to grip with physical and human capital, and we have
barely started to use social capital.
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Table 1. Two definitions, a reformulation and a proxy
Network definition ￿
N is the density of peoples informal network
Trust definition ￿
T is a measure of trust among people
Excess cooperation 
a) The excess propensity to play the cooperative solution in prisoners dilemma games
Putnam’s Instrument ￿ is the density of voluntary organizations
 b)
   Note. The definitions are discussed and some classics reprinted in Dasgupta & Serageldin (1999), see also
Putnam (1993, 2000), Deth et al (1999).
       a.  Taken as a reformulation of the trust definition in the »language« of game theory.
       b.  The density is often weighted by the amount of contact the individual has with the organization. 
We assume that the two definitions are closely related, so that given a proper calibration to the
same common scale, we have: 
(1)  ￿ = ￿
N + J
N, where J
N is small and random
(2a)  ￿ = ￿
T + J
T, where J
T is small and random
(2b) ￿
T = ￿ + J
￿, where J
￿ is small and random
One argument below is that the definitions are likely to deviate in the OC-countries, precisely
because they create problematic networks, bordering on the corrupt. If the J’s are small and
random we have:
Social capital dream:  ￿ = ￿
N = ￿
T = ￿ 
The dream is thus that all definitions have the same underlying »basis«. It will take some time
before we know if the dream contains some truth. Social capital is in the early stage of
development. No definition is generally accepted. It is clearly difficult to aggregate social capital,
and many problems of measurement remain to be solved. Still, we may learn that something basic
and robust lies beneath the idea of social capital, making it a useful variable.
5) Many other
concepts routinely used by economists are problematic. They are unsharply defined and easy to
»dissolve« into parts, which can only be aggregated for certain purposes. However, as we know
the limitations of the concepts, they are still useful.
The last variable, ￿, is Putnam’s Instrument. The voluntary organizations listed by
Putnam (1993) are comprehensive. That is, the list includes choral societies, bridge clubs and bird
watching societies. Clearly, it is not important for the development of society and the economy
that people get together to sing and look at birds. However, the fact that such societies exist and
are widespread in some places, but not in others, tells us something about the society. We
conclude that Putnam’s Instrument can be a proxy only.
Finally, we return to the point that cooperation and networks come in positive and
negative forms. People may cooperate about socially desirable goals or about goals decreasing6. We concentrate on the relation between social capital and the economy. Much of the social capital
literature is written by politologists concentrating on the relation between social capital and democracy
and good governance, see Putnam (1993, 2000), Deth et al (1999) etc. 
7. Paldam & Svendsen (2000a) discuss this simplification and present alternatives. 
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aggregate welfare. For example, they cooperate in mafias and similar gangs. Hells Angels have
plenty of esprit de corps, but they unite against the rest of the world and like to fight »wars«.
Normally, such negative networks and organizations are secret, and hence not recorded by polls
and other methods of measurement, but it does not, of course, mean that they do not exist. So
what we measure is:
(1) ￿ ￿￿ 
(+)
II.2  Relating social capital to the economy 
6)
Behind the growth argument - presented in the introduction - is the idea of a macro production
function:
(4) yt = Yt/Nt = Y(t, Lt, Kt, Ht), where . = (0Y/0t)/Y> 0, 0Y/0x > 0, 0
2Y/0x
2 < 0, for x = L,
K, H
Y is GDP, N is the population, t is time, L is employment, K is physical capital, H is
human capital, and . is the rate of technical progress. 
A huge literature discusses (4). It is fraught with problems, but it is widely agreed that it makes
enough sense to allow us some insight into the process of growth. The »optimistic« predictions
about the transition of the OC-countries mentioned in the introduction, relied upon the idea that
the levels of K and H in the OC-countries correspond to Y’s, which were larger than the Y’s
actually observed. 
The missing social capital idea can be expressed, simply by including social capital ￿t as
a factor of production.
7) This gives us equation (5). It is much less researched than (4), simply
because ￿t is much less known than the other variables, but let us for the moment assume that
it makes sense.
(5) yt = Y(t, Lt, Kt, Ht, ￿t), where 0Y/0￿ > 0, 0
2Y/0￿
2 < 0, and ￿ is normal social capital.
The negative social capital is negative precisely as 0Y/0￿ 
(￿) < 0. 
The missing social capital idea is simple: While the old communist regimes built K and H they
destroyed ￿, so that ￿ after the transition was much too small. If ￿ is a substantial factor of
production, and if the elasticities of substitutions between ￿ and the other factors of production
are limited, then the low ￿ produces a Y, which is (too) low. The optimistic prediction of
economists (in the terminology of the introduction non-d1 and non-d2) was thus based on
overlooking the low ￿.
Several of the micro-studies in World Bank (1999) suggest that ￿ is just as important as
H to the income of people, and hence to the generation of the product Y. The evidence is still8. Several of the leading researchers in empirical growth theory - as Dale Jorgenson - have argued (at least
verbally) that little space is left in our knowledge of the growth process for social capital to explain. 
9. This has often happened, eg, with choral societies in the Baltic Countries during the Soviet rule, and in
Denmark during the German occupation.
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scanty and disputed,
8) but the existing evidence seems to support the idea that ￿ is a substantial
factor of production. This is also the claim of Putnam (1993), Olson (1996) and other writers in
the »social capital school«.
III Dictatorship and social capital: A negative causal link
Dictatorship comes in many forms. We will distinguish among the three types listed in Table 2.
The most extreme form is totalitarianism. Wintrobe (1998; p 7-11) surveys a set of definitions
of totalitarianism, and ends by endorsing the definition of Hannah Arendt (quoted in Table 2).
Wintrobe stresses that the goal of total control - in part - is achieved through the »atomization«
of human relationships. That is, of course, the opposite of social capital.
Table 2. Three main types of dictatorship
Type Definition
Totalitarianism Totalitarianism is a system that aspires to the total domination of each 
single individual in each and every sphere of life.
Ordinary dictatorship  Rule by individuals (mainly military) who conquer power.
Absolutism Rule by Monarchs, who inherit power according to historical principles.
Often very durable.
      Note: Both monarchs and ordinary dictators normally »only«  try  to control political life, the
instruments of power and the media. Communist rule is in principle totalitarian, but its later
versions have been softer, more ordinary dictatorship.
III.1  The core observation: dictatorship destroys social capital
All dictators know that when people cooperate outside the control of the regime they may also
cooperate  against the regime.
9) Therefore, most dictators are against the uncontrolled
cooperation of their subjects. 
Public choice theory teaches that organizations have a strong inborn tendency to take on a
life of their own. The leaders - however appointed - often want to use the organization for their
own purposes. That means to rally their members behind themselves, but then they have to
provide something in return. Sometimes the central leadership turns so slack that the members
manage to seize the organization or a part of it and turn it into their own.
This is well known by all dictators, and they normally strive to build safeguards to secure
that all - or the main - organizations of society stay under full control, and that their leaders have
no possibilities to build their own power base. Leaders are often changed, or care is taken to10. The Empire created by Stalin did have one generation of leaders (normally the 2
nd) appointed by Stalin
in 1946-48, ruling in his spirit (such as Ana Pauker, Mátyás Rákosi, Jakub Berman and Klement
Gottwald).They were typically appointed instead of leaders with a local following, making them strongly
dependent upon their foreign boss. Soon after Stalin’s death most disappeared and a divergence of the
vassal states into more normal countries started. However, even in 1989 all the countries were still run
as Communist one-party states.
11. The biographical essay (novel) The Leopard (Lampedusa, 1958) brilliantly describes attitudes and values
in the Kingdom of Sicily at the time of the unification (1860-63). Perhaps the most illuminating is Cpt
4 where the Sicilian prince explains the deep level of distrust and inaction in Sicily to a »new« Italian
from the north. 
12. The story of the regime of General Franco is much like the one of his admirer General Pinochet, though
all numbers (see below) are larger, corresponding to the relative sizes of Spain and Chile and the
duration of the regime. Also, Spain went through a civil war (lasting 3 years), while Chile experienced
a coup lasting 10 hours. Note that even when Spain did have democracy before Franco, it was short-
lived.
13. The study builds on an investigation of a railroad car full of archive material for 1917-37 from Smolensk
Gubernaya/Oblast. It was occupied by Germany during the War and they loaded the car with party
archives, and sent it to Germany. After the War the archives became available to a group of US
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make them incompatible with their members.
10) Social control is crucial for all dictators who want
to remain in power. Totalitarian regimes are those who are most extreme in these matters. 
Putnam’s example (in his 1993 book) is the great difference of social capital in the North
and South of Italy, where the division is along a line somewhere between Rome and Naples. In
the South, the Kingdom of Sicily ruled for 700 years, till the unification in 1861. This Kingdom
is described as an example of absolutism that deliberately prevented the building of social capital.
It was not a particularly »bloody« regime, but it did try to control its subjects, and it had a secret
police, etc. Putnam stresses that the long time the regime lasted was crucial for the destruction
of trust and cooperation. Also, it led to the creation of the Mafia, which started as a secret
mutual aid organization among the peasants.
11) It is contrasted with the city-states of the North.
They did have their tyrants and ruling families too, but they kept changing, and in between the
citizens ruled. The Kingdom of Sicily appears much like Russia of the Czars. 
An example of ordinary dictatorship (of shorter duration) is Spain during the period, 1939-
75.
12) The study of Torcal & Montero (1999) observes that social capital (by available measures)
was low compared with similar Latin countries.
The mechanism is most easy to observe, when we consider the most extreme case: In a
totalitarian system the dictator wants to mold society into »his system«, with himself in the apex
and where everybody else is controlled. Totalitarian systems are one-party states, where the
dictator derives his power from being the leader of the party, and where the party chooses the
successor, when the dictator dies. Everybody has to be organized, under the control of the party,
and with the dictator as the head of the party. All organizations are thus integrated as parts of
the system. They are used to generate loyalty and control. 
Many studies have been made of such systems. Wintrobe tries to generalize a vast material
dealing mostly with the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. Of these systems the
Stalinist/Communist system proved the most durable. The most thoroughly researched study of
this system at its heyday, at the grass-roots level, is no doubt Fainsod (1958).
13) It documents thesovietologists, who made the study. 
14. The Pinochet regime ruled Chile for 17 years. It tried to have absolute power, without developing a truly
totalitarian system. It killed almost 3000 people. More than half were killed within one month after the
coup. In the remaining period less than 100 were killed per years, while the population increased from
9 to 13 mio inh. It is about 10% of the number killed in the traffic. Even when the number of tortured
was larger, it was still small by comparative standards. However, all evidence indicates that this was
enough to thoroughly intimidate the population. A rather similar case is the DDR regime. It did
intimidate without much killing especially during its last 30 years. 
15. We treat the Stalinist model as the »core« model of Communist totalitarianism. Many other softer
versions of the system have been tried. Some versions, as the Titoist model, and the Chinese model of
today are rather different from the core model, even when they had/have the Communist Party as the one
and only political party.
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extent of the control system. Even when it was both clumsy, slow and somewhat arbitrary, it did
extend into all spheres of life and nobody could be sure to do anything uncontrolled.
In the late DDR, the archives of STASI have been opened and subjected to much research
already. Once more the extent of control was staggering, as files on more than 10% of the adult
population existed. The control was kept till the end, even when the system gradually mellowed
a little.
The studies made all stress that the creation of fear and distrust is an important element in
totalitarian control. All totalitarian regimes have created competing instruments of repression and
fear, and some of these instruments have been made highly visible. The descriptions agree that
an atmosphere of intimidation is easy to create and most totalitarian regimes have greatly
succeeded in this endeavor. They do not need to kill and torture very many to be convincing.
14)
However, some totalitarian regimes have killed and jailed a sizable fraction of the popula-
tion, often in the form of wavelike purges that took a dramatic momentum of their own. This has
created a strong atmosphere of fear and distrust leading into paranoia. Those who live through
such periods tend to be changed. They have thoroughly learned to trust nobody, to obey
authority, and take no initiative of their own. The resulting atomization of social relationships
clearly involves destruction of social capital. 
The official main aim of the 70 years soviet system was to create a new socialist man and
eliminate capitalist man. In order to do so, all voluntary organizations were brought under the
leadership control of the communist party. By doing this, the party told people what to do, and
de facto abolished all unofficial voluntary organizations. Great efforts were made to root out
non-system initiatives and even the boy scouts were replaced by official party scouts (pioneers).
Strong incentives were given to restrict all activities to the (relatively) safe one of obeying orders.
The state made almost all decisions and left no room for entrepreneurship, experiments and
voluntary organization into social groups (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000).
 This can be summarized as hypothesis one: dictatorship and especially totalitarianism
destroys normal social capital.
III.2  Network under communism
15)
The preceding section hints that strict totalitarianism is rare. Hitler, Stalin (and his vassals), Mao8
and other extreme cases can be mentioned, but they are rare. Stalin’s successors gradually turned
softer. The system mellowed, even when it stayed totalitarian in principle and in many details till
the end. Two economic features of the communist economic system gave a big premium to non-
system cooperation, namely (1) supply constraints and (2) plan fulfilment pressures. The ensuing
mechanisms - see Table 3 - are often described (see, eg Nove, 1961, 1977). They created
informal networks bordering on the illegal. 
Especially the fixer-connections between firms were grey and often corrupt. Official
channels existed to change the plan when something went wrong. However, they were very
cumbersome and it was much better to »fix« something through grey channels and middlemen
(tolkach). The government and the party knew that such networks provided some flexibility to
the economy, so they were tolerated, if they did not go too far. In fact, directors who fulfilled
plan targets were rewarded, and those who stuck to the rules and failed were punished. Many
stories have been reported in the press where such networks got rather far (involving hundreds
of people protected by local top-politicians making millions of roubles) before they were stopped.
Table 3. Two features of communist systems giving non-system cooperation
Market Intermediate goods Consumer goods
Agents Firms Households
Feature Plan fulfilment pressures and
slowness of planning apparatus 
Supply constraints causing
queuing and quality problems 
Reaction Fixer and barter networks.
Often large scale deals. 
Shopping and barter networks.
Premiums on good
connections.
Legality Grey, often tolerated.
Often close to corruption
Partly legal or moderately grey.
Sometimes close to corruption
Households were supply-constrained (ie pressures of excess demand existed) and thus had forced
savings available if provisions of goods and services could be obtained - one way or another. On
the »white« side households were known to help each other with queuing, and bits and pieces
of »open free« markets were always permitted. However, much was in the »grey« or even
»black« sectors of the economy. In Poland from the late 1960s an open grey/black market for
foreign exchange was tolerated. Traders were not allowed to set up exchange shops with
permanent premises, but they walked the central streets and squares in the main towns in a highly
visible way with bags of money. The Central Bank and the planning authorities kept careful track
of the parallel rate of exchange and would openly admit that this was considered a safety-valve
for the excess demand.
Finally, it should be noted that the true costs of goods and services were hard to know in
the communist economy and rather irrelevant to most decision makers. People who had the right
to distribute goods and services could often do so with little regard to the costs. Hence, values
for goods and services in different uses varied and differed from the true cost structure. In other16. A well-known example was the wild prices for western jeans. Another example was Georgian traders






















* Necessary, thus ac-
  cepted, but controlled
* Harmful, but hard
         to control
words the price system had many irrationalities, and rents appeared in mysterious ways to be
picked by the audacious.
16) Once again, connections and »grey« fixer networks came to mean a
lot.
The above picture of the communist economy thus describes a society, where the grey/black
sector has a big potential and is allowed some leeway, but it is still kept under control by several
control systems. It consisted of several police corps, the banking system had financial control as
its main job, and in the end everybody was controlled by the party. 
Column 1 on Figure 1 shows the social capital consequences of model described. The
grey/black networks were necessary for the system. In a sense they represented normal social
capital, but they were precariously near to negative social capital. Clearly such networks are
harmful in a market economy, where the trading rules are to be respected not bypassed. 
With the softening of communism the safeguards and controls of the system weakened,
allowing the grey/black networks to bloom. Also, the official organizations gained some
independence. We have seen and heard many stories from Eastern Europe describing such
developments. 
Figure 1. The model of social capital development in the OC-countries presented17. In a corresponding study Helliwell & Putnam (1995) demonstrated that the conclusions for institution-
building holds for economic development as well. The connections in the Italian data are further
discussed in Granato, Inglehart & Leblang (1996) and Jackman & Miller (1996).
10
Figure 1 shows three columns. Column 1 for the communist society and Column 3 for the
developed market economy are very different. The latter has a moderate control system, a small
grey/black sector, and much social capital. The communist model has much more control, a
larger grey/black sector, much official organization and less normal social capital. The left-hand
side graph also illustrates the trade offs between the size of the control apparatus and the
grey/black sector. This can be summarized as:
Hypothesis two: The communist model generates grey/black networks, which are kept at
bay by a large control apparatus. 
When a dictatorship ends, social capital is low. The official organization made by the old
regime crumbles. People have learned distrust and to take no initiative of their own. At the same
time many other institutions weaken. This is particularly important for a transition from
communism:
Hypothesis three: The transition switches the grey/black networks from necessary into
harmful, and the weakening of institutions allowed this negative social capital to grow and
become a barrier to a normal economic development.
IV  Post communism: The problematic inheritance
The development from Column 1 to Column 2 on Figure 1 shows - in a highly stylized way - our
model of the transition of social capital. It did not develop in the direction of Column 3 of the
developed market economy, but in a much less favorable way. The control system weakened and
the grey/black networks - already in place - grew and turned decisively negative. At the same
time the official organizations collapsed, and only much smaller voluntary organizations
remained. 
IV.1  The normalization horizon: Putnam’s pessimism and other evidence 
Putnam’s study of Italy deals with the development of institutions of governance in Italy,
17) as
it analyzes the efficiency of new regional administrations set up after a municipal reform in 1970.
It shows large differences in the efficiency of the new administrations - especially between the
North and the South. This is ascribed to the difference in social capital in the two parts of Italy
due to the past. However, the two areas were united in 1861 - no less than 109 years before the
reform. The institutions of the Kingdom of Sicily were not dissolved the day Italy was united, but
allowed to fade away. However, in any case the time lag of at least half a century failed to close
the social capital gap, and it is supposed to remain till this day. This is a deeply pessimistic
perspective when we turn to the OC-countries.
Fortunately, other evidence exists. The study of Spain already mentioned (Torcal &
Montero, 1999) demonstrates that existing evidence shows that Spanish social capital ceased to18. The reader may remember that the Spanish Republic lasted one decade from 1923 till the civil war
started, while General Franco ruled from 1936 till 72. The story of Spain the last half century before
1923 is rather complex, with shifting monarchies, dictators and some democracy. 
19. German history before the Weimar Republic (1918-33) was that of a weak absolutism after the
unification 1864-7, as the reader is likely to remember.
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differ from other Latin European countries already 1-2 decades after democracy was
reintroduced.
18) However, as we will see below Latin DCs have low social capital compared with
other DCs. This also applies to France with its old tradition for democracy.
The study by Stolle & Rochon (1999) compares available measures of social capital in the
USA, Sweden and Germany. It shows no clear difference, even when Germany had democracy
a century later than the other two countries, and, in addition, had a short, but nasty, spell of
totalitarianism 1933/45.
19)
We thus conclude that the adjustment period does not need to be more than a few decades.
The reason why a large difference appears between Italy, Spain and Germany may be that social
capital has a propensity to stay in certain equilibria. Below we argue that social capital instead
of developing good dynamics may go bad and get stuck in a bad equilibrium.
IV.2  The replacement of public mass organizations with voluntary organizations
The study of Siisiäinen (1999) compares social capital in three Nordic countries (Norway,
Sweden and Finland) and the three Baltic countries using Putnam’s Instrument. The main results
are cited in Table 4. The comparison is made using a set of polls done in the late 1990s.
Table 4. The number of voluntary organizations the average citizen in 6 countries belongs to 
Number Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Lithuania
0 23 25 9 54 70 67
13 02 92 32 92 22 5
22 12 12 51 2 5 6
31 21 21 7 4 2 2
44 71 41 1 0
Above 4 8 7 14 1 1 0
Average 1.7 1.7 2.6 0.7 0.5 0.4 
   Source: Siisiäinen (1999). Polled data covering 1-2000 people in each country during the late 1990s.
Siisiäinen makes the point that the frequency of membership in organizations before 1989/90 was
much the same in the two country groups. However, here the organizations in the Baltic’s were
relatively few, but large, state-controlled mass organizations, while there were many more, but
often smaller, voluntary organizations in the Nordic countries. Since 1989/90 small changes only
have occurred in the Nordic countries. 
The system controlling the mass organizations in the Baltic’s collapsed in 1990, so did
the most of the organizations. All three Baltic polls report a reduction of two-thirds of member-20. The exact question is: »Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted or can’t you
be too careful in dealing with people?«. It is discussed and many aspects are analyzed in Uslaner (2000).
21. The ￿-index used is the one published by Transparency International, a German based NGO with the
net address: <http://www.transparency.de/welcome.html>. It is an aggregate of all available cross
country measures of corruption.
22. Treisman (2000) and Paldam (2000a) are the two most recent studies explaining the cross-country
pattern in the ￿-index with economic and cultural variables. The main explanatory variable is the GDP-
level, but also inflation is a strong explanatory factor. The regulatory system in the country also matters.
A wave of high inflation quickly increases corruption. The OC-countries had probably lower corruption
before the transition than now. However, it was still relatively high thanks to the high rent seeking
potential in the old system. Most of the increases can be explained by falling real income, and the wave
of high inflation in connection with the change of system.
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ship in the old mass organizations. In the process some organizations disappeared while others
managed to change and stay alive, and some of them even started to grow. Also, new
organizations were formed. However, there is still much less social capital than in the Nordic
countries.
Much the same findings appear in Rose’s (1999: p.151) study of Russia. He finds that
Russia today continues to suffer from a »missing middle« of organizations linking informal grass
root networks and modern organizations. Rather, the gap is filled by antimodern enterprises run
by former officials or by Mafia organizations. We return to Rose’s theory of antimodern society
below.
IV.3  Measures of generalized trust and corruption
The World Value Survey brings numbers for many polled items, see Inglehart et al (1998). One
is trust, measured in a general way - that is, the respondents are asked if they »trust« other
people.
20) This is perhaps the best measure available of social capital. Figure 2 compares the
answers with this question with the corruption perception index, ￿, for the same countries.
21)
Note that the ￿-index is really an honesty index, as low values show corruption and high values
honesty.
22) We have argued that this is the best measure available for negative social capital.
The country observations on Figures 2 to 4 have signatures dividing them into the
following groups: OC is the OC-countries and Or are the oriental countries. Two groups of
(high-income) DC’s are shown: WL is Western-Latin and WN is Western-North, as they are
dominated by German-British cultures. Belgium has an intermediate marking to show that it is
half way in both groups. Finally, Res is the group of the remaining countries. This group contains
4 Latin American countries. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.23. Respondents were asked whether they participate in different civic activities, i.e. voluntary, activities,
including: (a) social welfare services for the elderly and deprived; (b) education, art and cultural
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Figure 2. Generalized trust and corruption in 40 countries as discussed in text
Correlation r = 0.65
The first observation from Figure 2 is that the points follow a clear pattern. The two series are
both hard to measure, and thus likely to have considerable measurement errors. The errors are
unlikely to be correlated as the two series are reached by different methods. So the series are so
closely correlated as one could wish. Secondly, we note that the OC-points are totally separate
from the WN-points: as a crude rule of thumb trust is twice as high in the WN-countries and so
is honesty. Interestingly, the WL-countries are in between. So are the Latin American countries.
Two countries of interest stick out: It is China and Russia, both having relatively high
trust. The result for China is probably a serious measurement error (see Uslaner, 2000). The
result for Russia is less extreme, but it still causes Shleifer & Treisman (2000; p 99-105) to
downplay the importance of social capital. However, other studies find a low level of trust in
Russia. World Bank (1996; p 94) report that government credibility is low in Russia and Eastern
Europe in general. Rose and Mishler (1998) found similar results. A battery of questions about
trust in the institutions of Russian society showed that most Russians distrust every major
institution, especially the representative institutions of governance.
IV.4  The perceptions of political participation
A second variable from the World Value Survey is closely related to social capital, as shown by
Deth et al (1999). It is the density of civic participation.
23) Again it is a difficult variable toactivities; (c) local community affairs; (d) activities related to conservation, environment and ecology;
and (e) work with youth. The density of civic participation is measured as the percentage of these civic
activities in which an average respondent in a country is involved.
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measure, and the data reached for two countries differ very much from the others. It is available
for slightly fewer countries. Figures 3 and 4 compare the answers with the two variables of
Figure 2.
Both graphs support the view that we are dealing with aspects of something robust. The
WN and the OC-points are always separate with the WN-countries in the top-right corner and
the OC-countries in the bottom-left corner, indicating low values of the social capital related
variables. The difference is large in relation to the scale used.
Given that the OC-countries have too low GDP relative to their level of physical and
human capital (their (K, H)-values) we conclude that we have found evidence suggesting that
they are held back by their low social capital. The OC-countries have the same social capital as
the Latin-American countries, which have the same GDP-levels as well.
Figure 3. Generalized trust and perceived political participation in 33 countries
Correlation r = 0.62
Things thus hang nicely together until one looks at the WL-countries. They are closer to the OC-
countries than to the WN-countries in social capital according to most of the indicators tried.
Especially the low level of trust (22) in France is puzzling. The WL-countries are as rich as the
WN-countries, especially France and the northern parts of Italy and Spain. Note, however, that
the lowest scores of the social capital related variables are the ones to perception of participation.
In spite of recent reforms, the Latin countries are relatively centralized, with powerful central24. Several of the leading researchers (notably Anirudh Krishna) stress that social capital is a »latent«
variable that has to be measured by measures which are relevant for the particular environment. While
Putnam’s instrument seems relevant in an »European« cultural environment, it does not work in India,
where the level of voluntary organizations are low. In fact, the level of voluntary organizations in India
is lower than in most African countries. However, in other dimensions India scores (much) higher.
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administrations controlling weak local governments. Clearly, much about social capital is
puzzling.
24)
Figure 4. Perceived political participation and corruption in 33 countries
Correlation r = 0.71
A similar paradox is provided by Putnam (2000) demonstrating by a wealth of statistics that
(nearly) all indicators of social capital have gone down in the last two decades in the USA. This
large reduction has occurred during a period of particularly rapid economic growth in the
country. These developments contradict the idea that social capital is an important factor of
production.
However, disregarding the contradictory evidence, we conclude that the OC-evidence
speaks strongly of a low level of normal social capital and a high level of negative social capital.
We would very much have liked to have had time series for the relevant variables, but only bits
and pieces are available.
IV.5 The growth of the »shadow« economy
Several studies try to put some time series evidence together. Much evidence is found in a recent
conference volume (Feige & Ott, 2000) and surveyed by Schneider & Enste (2000) and most
recently by Schneider (2000). Given the inherent difficulties of measurement the evidence is16
surprisingly coherent. 
The studies quoted by Schneider suggest that the shadow economy has grown from about
16% of GDP in the average OC-country to about 40% from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s. The
growth is reported to be above average in Russia, and below average in the smaller, westernmost
countries as Estonia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In Poland, the shadow economy appears
to be shrinking, but it was relatively large before the transition started.
The numbers now reached are much like the ones calculated - by similar methods - for
the Latin American countries and much higher than the ones for the WN-countries. Once more
the WL-countries are in between. The numbers for the shadow economy given have thus much
the same pattern as the other social capital indicators, even when they are calculated by models
using standard economic variables.
IV.6  Two related ideas
A whole set of studies by Richard Rose (see, eg Rose and Mishler (1998) and Rose (1999))
develop a theory of antimodern social capital. His main point is that social capital networks (used
to produce goods and services) are distinctive in a society characterized by organizational failure
and corruption of formal organizations. In response against the State, individuals can invoke
informal networks: begging or cajoling public officials, using connections to »bend« rules or
paying bribes that break rules; social networks compensate for organizational failure. In this way,
Rose (1999: p.156) shows that citizens in Russia have formed many private networks for getting
things done.
Rose (1999: p.148-49) furthermore argues, that the persistence of such networks is a
formidable barrier to Russia’s transition from an antimodern to a modern society with a well-
functioning market economy. These informal interest groups maintain status quo by exploiting
their personal contacts, barter or bribes to get what they want within the existing system and they
range widely from ordinary households to the mafia. In all cases, mutual cooperation is based
on the morality of face-to-face groups that Max Weber characterizes as Binnenmoral. The
complement is »outsider moral« (Aussenmoral) which cannot stand on its own and therefore
justifies formal organizations (ibid: p.150). In fact, these informal groups are utilizing the same
potential for »rent-seeking« as are formal interest groups such as state monopolies. They trust
each other when undertaking these unofficial and hidden activities.
The second theory is due to Chand & Moene (see 1999a, and especially1999b). They
have developed a rather general corruption model with two equilibria. One has low social capital,
while the second has high social capital, ie they correspond to the OC bottom-left corner and the
WN top-right corner on the graphs. The second paper applies the model to Russia. The variables
used in the theoretical argument are not all observable, but everything looks much as our verbal
argument. It is reassuring that the logics pursued in this paper can be so neatly formalized. 25. The additional mechanisms mentioned in this section are treated in much detail in the transition
textbooks as Gross & Steinherr (1995) and Lavigne (1999).
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IV.7  Back to Figure 1: some additional mechanisms 
25)
When we compare Columns 1 and 2 on Figure 1 they imply a demand theory of control. Nobody
likes to be controlled, so when the system mellowed, the controls were reduced, and when the
system broke down in 1989/90, the controls were quickly reduced. The police systems turned
into normal »civic« police. The banking system turned into a Western banking system dealing
with credit no longer acting as a controller for the state. Finally, the all-over controller, the Party,
lost power. It should be added that at the same time the public salaries dropped making the new
police and the personnel in other institutions more vulnerable to the temptations of corruption.
Also, the first decade after the system change was one of large scale privatization. It is
always difficult to privatize, and here it was done by new and inexperienced regimes during a
period of chaos. So much arbitrary redistribution - sometimes known as rent grabbing - took
place. Arbitrary redistribution was also a side effect of the waves of high inflation, which
followed the big system change. Arbitrary redistribution is surely demoralizing for the population
to experience.
For all these reasons it is understandable that the low post communist social capital has
been slow to grow into the normal size fitting with the other factors of production. It also helps
to explain that instead it deteriorated into the negative.
V Concluding  remarks
It is important to start the conclusions by stressing our limited knowledge. Systematic theorizing
about social capital is recent. We understand little about the way social capital is built. Data
about its size and its development over time are still scanty. The following conclusions are
therefore tentative and made to encourage further research. We have presented an argument
summarized in three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 argued that the communist states - as all other dictatorships - destroyed
social capital. The data presented showed that it is as low in the transition economies of East and
Central Europe as it is in the Latin American countries. We have further argued that this may
explain why the GDP-level is low compared with the levels of physical and human capital.
Hypothesis 2 claimed that the communist system had the characteristics that it needed a
certain amount of grey/black networks to function. Such networks were consequently tolerated,
even when they were kept under control by massive control systems. 
Hypothesis 3 maintained that the big change in 1989/90 switched the old necessary
grey/black networks into (harmful) negative social capital, and the reduction in the control
systems (and the transition problems) allowed these networks to grow. The data presented were
weak on the time series evidence, but certainly supported the idea that the level of negative social
capital is high in the former communist countries.
When we turn from the past to the future, the two main problems are: (a) How fast is the18
building process for (positive) social capital going to be? (b) Can something be done to speed up
this process of social capital building?
Evidence about point (a) is not plentiful, but once again scattered observations exist. We
have argued that a couple of decades may be sufficient. On point (b), it is important to distinguish
between active interference and passive support. The logic of social capital warns us against
active interference. However, it seems likely that passive support may help. That means that
governments can do much by creating the proper enabling environment for social capital
generation and by fighting negative social capital.19
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